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ABSTRACT 
For intellectual property law and policy, the impact that patent rights may 
have on the ability of small companies to compete in the smartphone market is a 
critically important issue for continued robust innovation. Open and competitive 
markets provide vitality for the development of smartphone technologies. 
Nevertheless, the impact of patent rights on the smartphone industry is an 
unexplored area of empirical research. Thus, this Article seeks to show how 
patent rights affect the ability of small participants to enter, compete, and exit 
smartphone markets. The study collected and used comprehensive empirical data 
on patent grants, venture funding, mergers and acquisitions, initial public 
offerings, patent litigation, and marketing research data. This Article shows 
empirically that small participants succeed in the market when they have a low 
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and specific critical mass of patents and that this success exceeds the general 
norms in the startup world. Surprisingly, the analysis demonstrates that the level 
of financing and market success do not increase with larger patent portfolios. 
Lastly, despite the controversies over patent trolls, this Article demonstrates that 
patent litigation, whether from operating companies or NPEs, does not appear to 
be a significant concern for small players and does not appear to pose barriers to 
entry. The Article concludes by arguing that patent rights are providing 
incentives for innovation among small industry players and that contrary to some 
expectations, patent rights support competitiveness in the smartphone industry 
for small market players. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The relationship of patent rights to the competitiveness of companies in the 
smartphone industry is critical to understanding the dynamics of the 
smartphone market. This market is growing rapidly worldwide at staggering 
rates. Just in the third quarter of 2014, vendors sold over 325 million 
smartphones1 Meanwhile, “patent grants and patent lawsuits are rising 
dramatically.”2 Whether or to what extent patents support competitiveness or 
present barriers to entry is thus a key policy question for intellectual property 
and the development of future innovations in the smartphone field. 
Prior work shows that very little empirical analysis focuses on the specific 
role that patents play in the competitiveness of participants in information 
technology based markets.3 To begin to fill this gap, the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) commissioned a study that examined the role of 
patents with respect to large market participants in the smartphone industry (the 
“2012 Smartphone Patent Study”).4 The 2012 Smartphone Patent Study found 
that there was significant fluidity in market entry and exit among the large 
companies during a period of dramatic growth and concentration of patent 
portfolios.5 The study also showed that patent litigation reflected a trend for 
large companies to use patents as a defensive business strategy.6 
Since the 2012 Smartphone Patent Study only examined large participants 
in the market, there remains a need to understand the impact on small 
participants such as small businesses, individual inventors, or organizations 
with relatively limited involvement in the smartphone field. The goal of this 
study is thus to analyze comparable empirical data about small market 
participants with patents and individual inventors in order to ascertain how 
patents impact their ability to compete in the marketplace. 
 
 1.  See Press Release: Worldwide Smartphone Shipments Increase 25.2% in the Third 
Quarter with Heightened Competition and Growth Beyond Samsung and Apple, Says IDC 
(Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS25224914. 
 2.  2014 Patent Litigation Study, PWC at 5-6 (Jul. 2014) [hereinafter 2014 PWC 
study], http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2014-patent-
litigation-study.pdf.  
 3.  See Committee on Development and Intellectual Property (CDIP), Report on an 
Analysis of the Economic/Legal Literature on Intellectual Property (IP) Rights: a Barrier to 
Entry? WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (Jan. 16, 2012), 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_8/cdip_8_inf_6_corr.pdf. 
 4.  See Joel R. Reidenberg, Jamela Debelak, Daniel Gross & Elaine Mindrup, The 
Impact of the Acquisition and Use of Patents on the Smartphone Industry (WIPO: 2013), 
FORDHAM CENTER ON LAW AND INFORMATION POLICY (Dec. 13, 2012) [hereinafter 2012 
Smartphone Patent Study], http://www.wipo.int/ip-competition/en/studies/clip_study.pdf. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
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In Part II of this study, we summarize the definitions for the smartphone 
market that will be used by our analysis and describe the database of 
smartphone patents used for this study. To provide comparability, these 
definitions and the database were the same as those used and elaborated in the 
2012 Smartphone Patent Study.7 In Part III, we develop a methodology to 
identify small participants in the market and to collect data for these 
participants. Because comprehensive and reliable data on all small market 
participants is not readily available, the study analyzed empirical data for 
market participants holding at least one patent, as this group of market 
participants can be identified comprehensively. However, this selection 
necessarily limits the results and statistical analysis to those entities that have 
opted into the patent system and omits small entities that have not sought patent 
protections for their innovations.8 In Part IV, we present the findings from the 
empirical data in terms of the impact of patents on the small participants. Part 
V then addresses the impact of patent rights on the openness of the smartphone 
market with respect to small participants. 
I. DEFINING THE MARKET AND PATENT DATABASE 
The 2012 Smartphone Patent Study defined smartphones as “hand-held 
computing devices that (a) have the ability to make phone calls over cellular 
networks and (b) can transfer data and run applications over mobile computing 
networks.”9 That study further defined the smartphone market as comprised of 
four segments: 
1. Handset providers: Companies that provide smartphone devices to 
consumers. 
2. Software developers: Companies that develop operating systems, 
communication protocols, and other applications governing the 
behaviors of smartphones. Software developers provide software 
packages to handset providers in the form of operating systems 
and applications as well as to consumers in the form of 
applications. Operating system vendors represent a subset of the 
software developer market segment. 
3. Hardware suppliers: Companies that provide hardware integrated 
into the handsets, including computer chips, batteries, antennas, 
 
 7.  Id. at 2-6. 
 8.  This is an unavoidable selection bias. In the context of software, one study argues 
that startups in the software field may be reluctant to seek patents because of cost and a 
belief that patent rights will not be sufficiently useful to protect their inventions. See Stuart 
J.H. Graham, Robert P. Merges, Pam Samuelson & Ted Sichelman, High Technology 
Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Study, 24 
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1255, 1309 (2009). If this is correct more specifically for the smartphone 
field, then our study findings will not address those innovators. 
 9.  2012 Smartphone Patent Study, supra note 3, at 2. 
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and many other significant components. Hardware suppliers 
primarily sell integrated hardware, such as chipsets, to handset 
providers, but also provide parts and accessories, such as extended 
life batteries and cases, directly to consumers. 
4. Designers: Companies that focus on aesthetic design as a selling 
point for their products. Designers represent a subset of the 
handset providers and software developers, and generate hardware 
designs and designs for visual displays for smartphone handsets.10 
We use the same definition and market segments for this study. 
Similarly, the 2012 Smartphone Patent Study identified the most relevant 
patent classifications for smartphone technologies. The research showed that 
class 455 in the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
classification was the most relevant, and that a total of 14 classifications related 
most closely to smartphones: 
 
Table 1 – Relevant Patent Classes11 
Class Description 
320 Electricity: Battery or Capacitor Charging or Discharging 
341 Coded Data Generation or Conversion 
349 Liquid Crystal Cells, Elements and Systems 
361 Electricity: Electrical Systems and Devices 
370 Multiplex Communications 
375 Pulse or Digital Communications 
379 Telephonic Communications 
398 Optical Communications 
455 Telecommunications 
704 Data Processing: Speech Signal Processing, Linguistics, Language 
Translation, and Audio Compression/Decompression 
706 Data Processing: Artificial Intelligence 
707 Data Processing: Database and File Management or Data Structures 
715 Data Processing: Presentation Processing of Document, Operator 
Interface Processing, and Screen Saver Display Processing 
719 Interprogram Communication or Interprocess Communication (IPC) 
(Electrical Computers and Digital Processing Systems) 
 
From these classes, the 2012 Smartphone Patent Study assembled a patent 
bibliographic database for the utility patents and a separate database for the 
design patents, each consisting of the following information for all patents 
granted between 2006 and 2012: 
• Abstract – summarizing the contents of the patent. 
 
 10.  Id. at 3. 
 11.  Id. at 8. 
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• Patent Type – determining whether the patent is a utility or design 
patent. 
• Patent Number – identifying the relevant patent. 
• U.S. Classification – identifying the primary classification used 
for the relevant patent. 
• Title – identifying the contents of the patent. 
• Number of Claims – identifying how many claims were included 
in the issued patent. 
• Assignee – identifying the current patent holder for the issued 
patent.12 
This study takes the 2012 smartphone patent bibliographic databases as the 
starting point. The data set reflects both the rapid growth and the importance of 
smartphone innovation over the last ten years. In 2012, 20% of the patents 
granted were related to mobile phones.13 Less than a decade ago, this number 
was lower than 10%.14 Overall, smartphone patents account for just over 16% 
of all active patents.15 In comparison, the pharmaceutical industry has 
accounted for a little over 6% of U.S. patents over the past 15 years, and the 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) sector accounts for 40% 
of U.S. patents.16 
II. SMALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE SMARTPHONE MARKET AND DATA 
COLLECTION 
To focus on small smartphone market participants, this study used several 
metrics to select a random sample of appropriately sized entities and individual 
inventors. The study looks only at entities and inventors that have already 
sought patents because comprehensive, meaningful public data is available for 
these market participants unlike other small private businesses. As a result, the 
study does not consider entities that have no patents such as those organizations 
that license technologies rather than innovate, or those organizations that 
choose not to seek patents for their innovations.17 We first identified small 
 
 12.  Id. at 11. 
 13.  CHETAN SHARMA, MOBILE PATENTS LANDSCAPE: AN IN-DEPTH QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS 7-8 (2d ed. 2009). 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Daniel O’Connor, One In Six Active U.S. Patents Pertain To The Smartphone, 
PROJECT DISCO (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.project-disco.org/intellectual-property/one-in-
six-active-u-s-patents-pertain-to-the-smartphone/. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Relevant data for non-patent-holding individuals and organizations in the 
smartphone field is not publicly available. Some studies, though, argue that innovators in 
certain industries including software choose to use strategies other than intellectual property 
rights to commercialize their discoveries. See Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information 
without Intellectual Property, 91 TEX. L. REV. 227 (2012). 
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participants based on the size they claimed in filings with the USPTO. We then 
narrowed the selection based on the number of patents they had in the field and 
the number of patents they had in a particular subfield. From those entities and 
inventors, we chose a random sample and conducted a final manual filter to 
assure that the patent holders were small participants in the smartphone market. 
To collect further data for analysis, we researched publicly available 
information about each patent holder and prepared a survey to elicit 
information about the importance of their patents. 
A. Identification of the Entity Size Disclosed to the USPTO 
Because the U.S. patent statute provides for reduced filing fees and 
maintenance fees for small companies and individual inventors, the USPTO has 
records on the size of patent applicants and holders. Companies and individual 
inventors qualify for the reduced fees if they meet the following criteria: 
 
Small Business Entity: 
1. Applicant has fewer than 500 employees; and 
2. No rights in the application are promised or licensed to an entity 
that does not qualify.18 
Micro Entity: 
1. Must qualify as a Small Business Entity (per the above); 
2. Applicant or any joint inventor has filed fewer than four U.S. non-
provisional patent applications (not assigned to a prior employer); 
3. Applicant and listed inventor have income for the past year less 
than $150,00019; and 
4. No rights in the application have been promised or licensed to a 
non-micro-entity.20 
 
Fordham CLIP obtained the entity size based on these fee categories for all 
entries in the smartphone patent bibliographic database where an assignee was 
identified. For utility patents, Fordham Center on Law and Information Policy 
(CLIP) also extracted size information from the USPTO database of 
maintenance events.21 For design patents, size data is only available for 
applications because design patents are not subject to the payment of 
maintenance fees.22 In both the design and utility databases, entity size was 
 
 18.  13 C.F.R. § 121.802(a) (2013). 
 19.  This number will change annually based upon census median U.S. household 
income (3X median income). 
 20.  35 U.S.C. § 123 (2013). 
 21.  Every time a payment was made on a utility patent, the entity size of the payor at 
the time of payment was recorded by the USPTO. 
 22.  Fordham CLIP thus captured entity size as of the time the application was filed. 
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often not available for patents where no assignee was named (these patents 
were likely to be held by individual inventors or scholars). Fordham CLIP 
added all entity size data to the smartphone patent bibliographic database for 
analysis. 
Table 2 below shows the breakdown by entity size for both the utility and 
design smartphone patent bibliographic databases.23 
 
Table 2 – Number of Entities by Entity Size 
Entity Size Number of Entities 
Large 223,252 
Small 48,945 
Micro 89 
Unavailable 42,204 
Total 314,490 
 
B. Selecting Small Participants and Generating a Random Sample 
From the large number of potential market participants, relevant small 
participants had to be selected and a random sample drawn for analysis. In 
selecting the population to analyze, we sought a diverse group of small 
businesses and startups. First, the utility patent database was divided by 
classification into three groups—communications, hardware, and software—
using the classifications shown in Tables 3, 4, and 5 and drawn from the 2012 
Smartphone Patent Study24: 
 
  
 
 23.  Another study estimated that approximately 250,000 patents were relevant to 
modern smartphones in 2011. RPX Corp., Amendment No. 3 to Form S-1, 59 (Apr. 11, 
2011), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1509432/000119312511240287/ds1.htm 
(last visited Nov. 20, 2014). 
 24.  2012 Smartphone Patent Study, supra note 3, at 12-13. 
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Table 3 – Hardware Classification Numbers 
Class  Description 
349 Liquid Crystal Cells, Elements and Systems 
361 Electricity: Electrical Systems and Devices  
320 Electricity: Battery or Capacitor Charging or Discharging 
 
Table 4 – Software Classification Numbers 
Class  Description 
341 Coded Data Generation or Conversion  
704 Data Processing: Speech Signal Processing, 
Linguistics, Language Translation, and Audio 
Compression/Decompression 
706 Data Processing: Artificial Intelligence  
707 Data Processing: Database and File Management or Data 
Structures 
715 Data Processing: Presentation Processing of 
Document, Operator Interface Processing, and Screen 
Saver Display Processing 
  
Table 5 – Communications Classification Numbers 
Class  Description 
370 Multiplex Communications  
375 Pulse or Digital Communications  
379 Telephonic Communications  
398 Optical Communications  
455 Telecommunications  
719 Interprogram Communication or Interprocess 
Communication (IPC) (Electrical Computers and Digital 
Processing Systems) 
 
Design patents were placed into their own category. 
Table 6 below shows the breakdown by entity size and smartphone-related 
category of the entire smartphone bibliographic patent database. 
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Table 6 – Smartphone Patent Bibliographic Database 
Category Entity Size 
 
 
Because the number of qualifying entities in the database was so large, a 
random sample was necessary. However, the generation of a random sample 
from the database at large (or “direct element sampling”) would have yielded 
unpredictable results and would not necessarily provide a clear picture of the 
various kinds of small players in the data set. For instance, a random sample 
may have been skewed toward one category of patents such as design or 
communications, which make up larger relative proportions of the database. 
Similarly micro entities made up less than 1% of the database entries because 
the designation is new and might have been missed altogether. To avoid these 
potential biases, we adopted the “population framing” method for the 
generation of the random sample.25 
 
 25.  In statistics, “population framing” allows the survey planner to organize a data set 
to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the random sample and to ensure that the 
various groups of interest are represented in the random sample. See RAYMOND JAMES 
 
Category/Size 
Number of 
Entities 
Communications 95,057 
Large 86,835 
Small 7,301 
Micro 30 
Unavailable 891 
Hardware 25,727 
Large 23,225 
Small  2,203  
Micro 13 
Unavailable 286 
Software 43,186 
Large 38,177 
Small 4,373 
Micro 46 
Unavailable 590 
Design 150,520 
Large 35,068 
Small 75,015 
Unknown 40,437 
Grand Total 314,490 
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For population framing, the patent database was further subdivided as 
shown below in Table 7. From each of the patent classification groupings, 
companies with three to five patents were extracted. This ensured that niche 
players in each category would be analyzed. We did not limit these patent-
holders by entity size in order to capture startups and small companies that 
were purchased by larger entities before making their first maintenance 
payment. Similarly, we extracted as a sample frame for each of the patent 
classification groupings, companies that reported a small or micro entity size, 
regardless of the number of patents they held. This was to ensure there was no 
bias in the sampling based on the number of patents. To obtain companies that 
were not limited to niche products or services, we also extracted all entities 
with one or two patents regardless of reported size as a population frame and all 
companies that reported small or micro status with ten or more patents. To 
capture individual inventors or unincorporated entrepreneurs, we also framed 
all filings for which entity status was not available and that had no assignee 
name. 
Table 7 – Population Sample Frames 
 
 
Because the frame selection resulted in more companies than could 
reasonably be studied, a random sample was chosen. Each entry was assigned a 
random number within each population frame and the groups were shuffled by 
sorting on the random number. We chose an initial random sample of 400 
companies by extracting the patent entries from the categories shown in Table 
7. This large initial sample was chosen to account for duplication and so that 
sampling errors could be corrected through manual filtering, as discussed 
below. 
 
JESSEN, STATISTICAL SURVEY TECHNIQUES 160-62 (1978). 
Category Entity Size Number of Patents DB Hits 
Communications Any Between 3 and 5, inclusive 3,692 
Communications Small or Micro Any 7,331 
Hardware Any Between 3 and 5, inclusive 1,283 
Hardware Small or Micro Any 2,216 
Software Any Between 3 and 5, inclusive 2,128 
Software Small or Micro Any 4,419 
Design Any Between 3 and 5, inclusive 12,067 
Design Small or Micro Any 35,069 
Any Small or Micro 10 or more 14,713 
Any Any 1 or 2 34,492 
Any Small, Micro, 
or N/A 
N/A – (No Assignee Name) 2,250 
Grand Total 119,660 
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Finally, to be sure that we did not omit any important players with patented 
technologies in the relevant field, we applied key word searches to the full 
smartphone patent bibliographic database for a manual review. The key word 
search was conducted on the abstract and title of every patent in the database 
for the following terms: “smartphone,” “smart phone,” “handset,” “mobile 
phone,” “cellular phone,” “touchscreen,” “3G,” and “4G.” Small or micro 
entities that hit on the keywords were added to the random sample for filtering. 
Most results yielded large companies such as Samsung and High Tech 
Computer Corp. Only nineteen potentially small companies were identified 
using this method and were included in the initial frame. 
C. Manual Filtering 
Manual filtering entailed a review of the patent or patents for each of the 
randomly selected entities and an initial review of the publicly available data 
for each company or inventor to confirm the entity size as a small company and 
whether the business was relevant to the smartphone industry.26 Some very 
large organizations with few patents in the relevant field were removed by this 
filtering.27 Similarly, a manual review and filter of the nineteen potentially 
small companies identified by key word searches was also conducted. This 
review sought to confirm the claimed entity size, the relevance of the patents to 
smartphones, and the actual involvement of the business in the smartphone 
market. 
Also, some patents were assigned to multiple large entities at the same 
time. These were either charitable conglomerates or telecommunications 
standards co-invented in the context of a standards setting organization.28 
Though these entities were small patent holders and novel, we did not consider 
them to be small players. Therefore, they were not included in the final sample. 
In addition, several very large entities, captured in the random sample as 
patent holders, had small entity status due to their non-profit structure. This 
included government-sponsored research institutes, institutions of higher 
education, and standards setting organizations listed as patent owners. These 
 
 26.  The main sources used (where available) for this preliminary review were the 
entities’ own websites, LinkedIn and similar marketing materials, Business Week entries, 
other patents assigned to the entity or inventor, and news articles.  
 27.  This included companies like Sirius and NEC. Many of these large companies 
made a one-time foray into the smartphone world (i.e. internal startups), and thus were not 
included in this study of small companies. Several large corporations had subsidiaries or 
slightly misspelled names, which caused them to erroneously show up in the small entity 
population frame.  
 28.  Charitable conglomerates, such as Intel-GE Care Innovations, provide useful 
innovations to the public, often in the form of patents. Standards setting organizations, in this 
database, mostly fell in the realm of telecommunications standards. These are often created 
and proposed to a standards setting organization by multiple companies who then file a joint 
patent.  
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organizations were also pruned from the sample. Standards-essential patents 
not owned directly by these large non-profit organizations would still be 
captured in the sample. 
Care was taken not to exclude large entities that were, until recently, small 
players. To accomplish this, a historical records and news search was 
conducted to determine whether the entity recently was in a startup funding 
phase, was purchased by a larger corporation, suddenly expanded, or went 
public. Likewise, small companies that recently went defunct and/or sold their 
intellectual property to larger entities were maintained in the sample. 
The sample was also pruned of patents and businesses that were clearly not 
related to the design, software, hardware, or communications involved with 
smartphones. The sample was also expressly filtered to exclude accessories to 
smartphones such as batteries and cases, base-station technologies, server-side 
technologies, and product packaging. 
Lastly, the sample was filtered to exclude industrial wireless 
communications innovations that were not related to smartphones, such as error 
monitoring on pump jacks and vehicle fleets, or municipal communications 
grids. Likewise, entities with patents for mesh networks were excluded unless 
they dealt specifically with smartphones. Semiconductor companies that did not 
market to smartphones were excluded as well. 
In the process of pruning, several more random samples were extracted 
from the population frame to achieve a data set comparable to the size of the 
2012 Smartphone Patent Study. Of the 650 companies initially extracted as a 
random sample for consideration, 46 companies and individual inventors 
satisfied the filtering criteria and were retained for analysis as small 
participants in the smartphone market. These small participants are listed in 
Appendix A. 
D. Collection of Publicly Available Data 
For each of the 46 selected small market participants, a data set was 
compiled using publicly available sources. The data consists of (1) the type of 
business conducted by the companies; (2) contact information; (3) litigation 
involving the company, both patent and non-patent; (4) acquisitions, funding, 
and other investment information; (5) patents; (6) press releases and web 
marketing related to patents. The following describes generally the information 
collected and the public sources of data that were reviewed and cross-checked 
for each category. 
1. Type of businesses conducted: This data gives a brief overview 
of the company’s main business and how, if at all, it is related to 
smartphones. The information was used to evaluate each 
company’s perceived impact on the target industry—smartphones. 
The information was collected through the following online 
resources: LinkedIn; CrunchBase; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; and 
companies.findthebest.com. 
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2. Contact information: The names of individuals at the target 
companies including title of the person, address, phone number, 
email, and website of the company, were collected where 
available. This information was used to contact the companies to 
administer the survey. This information was collected through the 
following online resources: USPTO Public PAIR; LexisNexis; 
Yahoo Business; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; and 
companies.findthebest.com. Where this information was 
unavailable, we attempted to contact the attorney that filed the 
patent application in order to try to make contact with the patent 
holder. 
3. Litigation information: All U.S. court litigation where the small 
participant companies were a party, including patent infringement 
and non-patent cases, were collected and reviewed. This 
information was used to determine how these companies interact 
and conflict with each other using the U.S. court system. RPX 
Corp., LexisNexis, and Bloomberg News databases were used to 
identify the relevant litigations. In total, we identified and 
reviewed thirty-eight patent lawsuits and twenty-two non-patent 
ones. 
4. Acquisition, funding, and other investment information: 
Information regarding the date, amount, and participants in 
mergers and acquisitions, rounds of funding, public stock 
investments, and other investments were collected for each target 
company. This information was compared to the patent data to 
determine whether any correlation existed between patents and 
investments. The information was collected from AngelList, 
CBInsights.com, Crunchbase.com, Dealipedia.com, 
BusinessWeek.com, edgar-online.com, BizJournals.com, and 
Nasdaq.com. 
5. Patents: A database of each target company’s patent portfolio was 
collected and then compared to our database of smartphone-related 
patents from which we chose our initial sample of target 
companies. This information was mined from the bulk patent data 
provided by the USPTO through Google’s and ReedTech’s 
database retrieval tools found at google.com/patents and 
patents.reedtech.com, respectively, as well as by strutpatent.com. 
6. Press releases and web marketing: Publications by and about 
each target company were retrieved and reviewed for discussion of 
the company’s patent portfolio. This information was used to 
gauge the perceived importance of each company’s patents as seen 
by the companies themselves and in the public press. This 
information was collected from Google News, Bloomberg News, 
CrunchBase, and each company’s websites, where one or more 
existed. 
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E. Demographic Breakdown of the Sample 
Table 8 shows the countries of origin for the 46 selected small participants. 
 
Table 8 – Breakdown by Country 
Country Total 
Canada 2 
Israel 1 
Netherlands 1 
Sweden 2 
Switzerland 1 
US 39 
Grand Total 46 
 
The vast majority of the 46 selected small participant companies were 
domestic U.S. companies or ones that had headquarters and strong ties in the 
U.S. The seven foreign companies appear to be from known startup hubs. Israel 
and Sweden are both well known for their startups and Switzerland’s “Silicon 
Alps” is an up-and-coming startup hub. According to data compiled by 
Washington State University College of Business, Canada ranks as one of the 
top places to build a startup due to its high rate of post-secondary education, 
low cost of living, and relatively flat rate of inflation. Amsterdam too has had 
its fair share of startup successes.29 For these reasons, it is not surprising that 
our random sample pulled companies from these specific countries. 
Similarly unsurprising is the distribution of the states of incorporation of 
smartphone startups within the U.S. Table 9 shows this distribution. The largest 
percentage (43.5%) is incorporated in Delaware. This compares to the 
incorporation rates for other industries. In 2012, more that 50% of the major 
corporations in the world were incorporated in that state.30 
 
Table 9 – Breakdown by State of Incorporation 
 
 29.  Location, Location, Location, WASH. ST. U., 
http://omba.wsu.edu/resources/infographics/infographic-location-location-location/ (last 
visited Oct. 18, 2014). 
 30.  Leslie Wayne, How Delaware Thrives as a Corporate Tax Haven, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jun. 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/business/how-delaware-thrives-as-a-
corporate-tax-haven.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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Of the 46 chosen participants, 17 registered with the USPTO as large 
organizations and 29 as small ones. Of the large organizations, seven changed 
from small to large over the date range examined. Of the small ones, only one 
changed from large to small. Therefore, at some point over the time period 
studied, 78.3% of the chosen participants were registered as small. This is 
reflected in Table 10 below. 
 
Table 10 – Breakdown by Reported Size 
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As of October 2014, most of the 46 selected small participants were still 
alive in some form. Of the selected participants, 60.7% are still functioning or 
have been acquired by a company that is still functioning; 9% have dissolved; 
4% are dormant but not formally dissolved; and 13% are inventors in the 
smartphone field who have not assigned their patent rights to a corporate 
organization.31 Table 11 shows this distribution. 
 
Table 11 – Current State of Sample Companies 
 
 
For other demographic data, public information was not easy to find for 
our selected sample because most of the sample consisted of small private 
corporations (some foreign) or individual inventors with no public reporting 
requirements. Only 9% of our sample companies were at some point public. 
We were, nonetheless, able to collect detailed funding information totaling over 
$2.8 billion for 63% of the selected companies. Of the 46 selected small 
 
 31.  Companies classified as “Functioning” were those companies that were current on 
their corporate filing fees in the place of incorporation or otherwise were still clearly doing 
business (e.g. active website and/or sales). Companies classified as “Acquired” were 
determined with reference to public information through AngelList, CBInsights.com, 
Crunchbase.com, Dealipedia.com, BusinessWeek.com, edgar-online.com, BizJournals.com, 
and Nasdaq.com. Companies classified as “Dissolved” were those companies that filed for 
dissolution with the secretary of state in the place of incorporation. Companies classified as 
“Dormant” were those companies that were delinquent on one or more filing fees in the 
place of incorporation, allowed their website to go down for an extended period of time, 
and/or were classified as such because press releases indicated the company was no longer 
functioning. Companies classified as “Unincorporated Inventors” were those whose patents 
were assigned directly to an inventor and not a corporate entity.  
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participants, 47.8% received venture funding. A few of our participants also 
received a mix of funding from government contracts, “Angels,” partial 
acquisitions, full acquisitions, and joint ventures. Litigations are, for the most 
part, public so that was more easily collected. Thirty-five percent of the study 
participants were involved in some type of litigation including intellectual 
property and other matters, as plaintiff or defendant. This is much lower than 
the reported rate of litigation (82%) for U.S. companies and lower than the rate 
of litigation for smaller companies (65%).32 
F. Survey 
In addition to the data we collected from public sources, we sought direct 
information from the 46 selected small participants. We constructed a survey to 
collect information about the use and effect of smartphone patents from 
individuals at the chosen companies. This survey is attached as Appendix B.33 
Survey respondents were offered the opportunity to remain anonymous. 
But, even with that assurance, we received an insufficient number of responses 
to perform any meaningful analysis. 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE MARKETPLACE 
In this Part, we analyze the empirical data. First, we examine the 
smartphone patent database as a whole. Then, we examine how patent 
portfolios are built as a small player in the smartphone field begins to grow. 
This examination looks at the relationship between smartphone business 
activity and patent holdings, and at the relationship between overall business 
activity and patent holdings. Next, we examine whether patent portfolios affect 
the ability for small participants to secure funding. Finally, we investigate 
 
 32.  In assessing litigation trends, Norton Rose Fulbright surveyed U.S. companies and 
reported that in the U.S.: (1) 82% of companies had at least one suit filed during 2013; (2) 
65% of smaller companies (those with less than $100 million in revenue) had at least one 
suit filed. See Norton Rose Fulbright’s 10th Annual Litigation Trends: US companies 
increasingly concerned about regulatory investigations, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (Apr. 15, 
2014), http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/115045/norton-rose-
fulbrights-10th-annual-litigation-trends. 
 33.  We identified contact information for 41 of the firms that were selected for this 
study. We began sending emails to these contacts on July 10, 2014. We sent a first reminder 
email to the participants on July 22, 2014. Then, we began calling each company to solicit 
responses on August 12, 2014. We continued calling the numbers that had had not been 
disconnected, and for whom participants had not specifically opted out, until September 5, 
2014. We sent a final reminder email on September 3, 2014 to the 35 participants that had 
not yet responded to the survey and whose email addresses did not bounce back as 
undeliverable on the first email attempt. All-in-all, and despite these efforts, the Fordham 
CLIP received a very minimal response to the survey. Two companies agreed to submit 
electronic survey responses, but only one in-fact did so, and one company provided off-the-
record oral responses. 
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whether patent litigation is helping, harming, or neutral to the small players. 
A. Smartphone Business Activity and Patent Holdings 
1. Analysis 
From a high level taxonomy of the entire smartphone patent database 
including all organizations holding any smartphone-related patents, it appears 
that smartphone-related patents are concentrated with large companies. 
Organizations that registered as large (i.e. with more than 500 employees) hold 
90.4% of smartphone utility patents.34 Broken down by type of patent, the 
concentration of large corporations remains the same. Large corporations own 
91.4%, 90.3%, and 88.4%, respectively, of the communications, hardware, and 
software patents.35 On average, a large corporation in the smartphone field has 
1488 patents. By contrast, a small organization has an average of 61 patents 
and a micro organization (though this designation is fairly new in the USPTO) 
has an average of 3.4 patents. 
Most smartphone-related utility patents are communications patents. There 
are many more software patents than there are hardware patents, but both 
categories represent a significant percentage of smartphone patent portfolios. 
Table 12 shows this distribution. 
  
 
 34.  See supra, section III.A. 
 35.  The patent classification numbers that break down into these three categories, 
communications, hardware, and software, are defined above in section II.B. 
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Table 12 – Breakdown of Smartphone Utility Patents in Database36 
 
 
Our randomly selected sample of small players has a similar breakdown, 
albeit with a few key differences as shown in Table 13 below. The basic 
hierarchy is the same; communications represents the largest share followed by 
software and then hardware. However, for our small players, there is a higher 
percentage of communications patents and a very small percentage of hardware 
patents. 
 
Table 13 – Breakdown of Smartphone Patents in Sample 
 
 
Among the 46 selected small participants, those that have been acquired or 
are still functioning had, on average, a larger portfolio. Similarly, the median 
portfolio size for acquired companies was noticeably larger than those for all 
 
 36.  Design patents are not shown here for the overall database because the separate 
database that was constructed for the 2012 Smartphone Patent Study was over-inclusive to 
account for the uncertainty of design classifications.  
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other dispositions. However, an outlier in the functioning category meant that 
the median for functioning companies was slightly lower than the median 
holdings for dissolved companies. This is shown in Table 14. The category of 
patents a company has does not seem to matter for the company’s long-term 
outcome. All the companies that were dissolved or are now dormant only had a 
small number of communications patents. Of the sample, 60% of the 
companies had only communications patents in their portfolios, 13% had only 
software patents, 2.2% had only hardware patents, and 2.2% had only design 
patents. This means that only 22.6% of selected small participants had a 
diversified portfolio. 
 
Table 14 – Patent Categories and Business Survival 
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2. Impact 
The demographics of the small participants with patents indicate that they 
have a surprisingly strong survival rate. Studies show that between 40% and 
90% of all types of startups in the United States fail, depending on the 
industry.37 While these studies do not distinguish between startups with patents 
and those without, the failure rate of the small participants that have patents in 
the smartphone industry (as measured by dissolution or dormancy over the six 
year period between 2006-2012) was only 13%.38 This suggests that the small 
participants in the smartphone industry with one or more patents are 
significantly more stable than startups in general.39 
 
 37.  Faisal Hoque, Why Most Venture Backed Companies Fail, FAST COMPANY (Dec. 
10, 2012, 6:02 AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/3003827/why-most-venture-backed-
companies-fail; Startup Business Failure Rate By Industry, STATISTIC BRAIN, 
http://www.statisticbrain.com/startup-failure-by-industry/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2014); Glen 
Dalakian II, 90% of Tech Startups Fail, WAMDA (Feb. 7, 2013), 
http://www.wamda.com/2013/02/90-percent-of-tech-startups-fail-infographic; Scott Shane, 
Startup Failure Rates, SMALL BUSINESS TRENDS (Apr. 28, 2008), 
http://smallbiztrends.com/2008/04/startup-failure-rates.html. 
 38.  See supra, Tables 11 and 14 and accompanying text. Recognizing that there are 
other possible instances that may be considered failures, including bankruptcy restructuring, 
unfavorable acquisitions, or a complete lack of market share growth, the study examined the 
publicly available data and did not find any other significant events indicating apparent 
“failure” in this sample. 
 39.  Failure rates specific to start-ups holding patents are not available; and thus, a 
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While the overall failure rate of the small participants was extremely low, 
the failures seemed to be concentrated in participants holding a small number 
of communications patents.40 Table 14 illustrates that those small participants 
with more diversified portfolios, or with a large number, of smartphone patents 
had a better chance of business survival. For those companies that were 
dissolved or went dormant, half formally assigned all their patents to another 
company, while the disposition of the patents of the other half could not be 
ascertained.41 The unknown disposition of patents for half the failed companies 
may reflect either an abandonment of the patent or an unrecorded assignment. 
In any case, the recorded assignments of eight of the nineteen smartphone 
patents held by failed companies indicate that smartphone patents are still an 
important asset to be salvaged from a company’s failure. That some companies 
took the time to perfect their assignment by filing it with the USPTO (eight 
patents in total) provides an indication that these smartphone patents had 
ongoing value despite the company failures. 
While design patents are also part of a well-diversified portfolio, small 
participants in our sample did not typically include design patents in their 
portfolios. Our sample companies and inventors had, on average, less than one 
design patent each, and only 8.6% of the sample had a design patent. The rarity 
of design patents may be because the small participants are rarely large enough 
to manufacture, sell, and distribute a physical consumer product. It is also 
possible that, to protect the outward appearance of a product, companies simply 
rely on trademark and trade dress law. 
 
direct comparison for patent holding start-ups and patent holding smartphone market 
participants is not possible. 
 40.  For our sample of small participants, communications patents are clearly the most 
important and sought-after patents in the field. Communications patents have, at their heart, 
a theoretical and cognitive element that does not always require the application of expensive 
machinery to invent. Reducing hardware to practice—whether it is a consumer device or 
component for another business to use—is more expensive. This may explain the difference 
between the relative portfolios of the small and large players. It may also be that 
participation in the various communications standards-setting organizations is lucrative 
enough to incentivize even small companies to focus their efforts in that area. While 
designing around software and hardware patents may be possible, communications patents 
are often incorporated into standards, such as 4G LTE, and may be more difficult to avoid. 
This study did not identify whether any patents were declared essential to a standard. A prior 
study found that less than one third of smartphone patents in litigation were declared 
essential to a standard, concluding that “the smart phone patent wars do not appear to be 
driven by SEPs . . . .” Kirti Gupta & Mark Snyder, Smart Phone Litigation and Standard 
Essential Patents, HOOVER IP WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 14006 (May 16, 2014), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2492331. 
 41.  Of the six companies in the sample that were dissolved or dormant, three (Wisair, 
ORO Grande Technology, and ISP Operator) assigned all of their smartphone patents to 
another company while the disposition of the patents for the other three (Samhain Union, 
incNetworks, NexStep) is not known. The USPTO assignment database for the eleven 
patents held by Samhain Union, incNetworks, or NexStep contains no information on the 
disposition of the patents. 
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B. Overall Business Activity and Patent Portfolios 
To understand the overall business activity of the small market participants 
in our sample, we examined the complete patent portfolios including non-
smartphone related patents and sought to understand the impact of the 
portfolios on the small participants’ competitiveness. 
1. Analysis 
Many of the 46 selected small smartphone market participants also have 
patents in fields other than smartphones. This means that their business 
activities are not exclusively, and possibly not predominantly, in the 
smartphone market. Overall, only 41% of the patent portfolios owned by the 
entities in the sample are smartphone-related patents. On average, the small 
participants have twenty-two patents granted and thirty-two patents filed. The 
median number of patents granted, however, is only eleven, with the largest 
number of companies in the four to ten patent range. A few entities in the 
sample with very large portfolios (specifically, SiRF with 268 and Newport 
Media with 116 patents) skew the average to appear higher. Table 15 shows 
this frequency distribution of utility patent grants and filings. 
 
Table 15 – Total Utility Patent Grants and Filings 
 
 
 
With respect to the overall types of patents held by the small 
participants in the smartphone market, they appear to keep their portfolios 
balanced between smartphone patents and other patents, as seen in Table 16 
below. We examined this balance by running a statistical correlation analysis to 
determine whether our sample participants favor smartphone patents over non-
smartphone related patents while growing their portfolios. The correlation 
coefficient between the arrays of the number of smartphone patents per entity 
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and the number of other patents is 0.84 with a coefficient of determination (r2) 
of 70.5%.42 This correlation shows that small players in the smartphone market 
generally keep the number of smartphone patents in their portfolio in similar 
proportion to the number of non-smartphone patents. 
 
Table 16 – Patent Distribution 
 
 
In terms of business continuity, Table 17 below shows the outcomes based 
on the size of the patent portfolio. Of the sample participants with ten or more 
patents, eight were acquired and six are still functioning. None of these small 
participants appear to be dissolved or dormant. In other words, companies with 
ten or more patents tend to survive. With respect to the companies that own one 
to three patents, these market participants are distributed fairly evenly among 
the categories with the largest portion still functioning.43 
 
 
 42.  The correlation coefficient here is used to measure the direction and strength of the 
linear relationship between these two variables: smartphone patents and other patents. This 
coefficient is between -1 and 1. The closer the coefficient is to 1 or -1, the stronger the 
relationship between the variables. If it is close to zero, there is no correlation. A coefficient 
of greater than .8 generally indicates a strong correlation. If the coefficient is positive, it 
means that the two values tend to change in the same direction. If it is negative, they tend to 
change in opposite directions. The square of the coefficient (referred to as the “coefficient of 
determination”) is the measure of how often of the variance of one variable is predictable by 
a change in the other.  
 43.  The instance of lapsed utility patent maintenance fees is very low in our sample, 
indicating the continued operation of the patent holder. Seventy four percent of the sample 
did not miss a fee; all of their patents are in good standing. Five out of the twelve companies 
(42%) that allowed one or more patent fees to lapse were acquired by another company; 
three are still functioning; and only three appear to be dormant or dissolved. All but one have 
other patents in their portfolio for which fees are in good standing. Design patents have no 
maintenance fees, so no data about their retention is available.  
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Table 17 – Outcome Based on Number of Patents 
 
2. Impact 
The juxtaposition of patent holdings with business activity indicates that a 
larger patent portfolio correlates to a higher likelihood of business survival. 
None of the companies with ten or more smartphone patents in their portfolio 
appear to have stopped functioning during the study period. By contrast, nearly 
20% of the companies with fewer than three patents appear to have failed; the 
remaining companies with fewer than three patents appear to be still 
functioning or have been acquired. Table 17 reveals similarly that the 
companies with four to six patents fail more frequently than those with larger 
portfolios. After ten patents, a company’s survival rate increases dramatically.44 
But, this may simply indicate that companies with more funding obtain more 
patents.45 This may show that there is a benefit to having patents for the 
survival of a business and coupled with the findings in Table 18 that show 
increases in patent prosecution during fundraising, patents do appear to 
correlate with business survival. We examine the relationship between funding 
and patents in Part IV.C below. 
The research also indicates that small market participants rarely focus 
exclusively on smartphones. Though we have identified companies and 
 
 44.  This study found no correlation between the age of a company and the number of 
patents it held. A regression analysis yielded an r2 of 0.002 for the correlation between the 
age of a company and the number of smartphone patents that it owned and an r2 of 0.02 for 
the correlation between the age of a company and the total number of patents (including non-
smartphone patents) that it owned. 
 45.  A recent study conducted by data analytics firm CB Insights strongly suggests that 
the amount of funding a company raises is strongly correlated with the likelihood of its 
survival. 55% of startup companies that failed had raised less than $1 million. The R.I.P. 
Report – Startup Death Trends, CBINSIGHTS (Jan. 18, 2014), 
https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/startup-death-data/. 
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individuals that have a small presence in the smartphone market place, only 
41% of the patents in their portfolios were smartphone patents. The available 
websites for the 46 selected small participants reveals that most of the small 
participants have other products and markets outside the smartphone field. For 
example, 82.6% of the sample had patents in non-smartphone patent 
classifications; of the remainder, 6.5% were individual inventors. Only a small 
portion of the sample (10.9%) were companies that patented technologies 
solely related to smartphones.46 
With respect to design patents, the trends are similar to the industry as a 
whole. The small participants do not obtain design patents nearly as often as 
utility patents, and they rarely obtain design patents. As a general matter, 
design patents are valuable to protect the external designs of consumer-facing 
products, and the small participants typically do not offer consumer products. 
The small participants will often sell their products to other businesses, or their 
consumer product is software, not a physical product. This may be one reason 
design patents are rare among small players. Another reason may be that there 
is relatively little jurisprudence covering design patents, as compared to utility 
patents. Enforcing a design patent (unless it is so iconic and necessary to the 
success of a company) is complicated when compared to trademark and trade 
dress assertions. 
Hence, on average, a small participant has less than one (0.83) design 
patent in its portfolio. All but five of the small participants (89%) in the sample 
have no design patents at all. The rare small participants that do have design 
patents, such as Control4 and Intertel, have a collection of design patents. Not 
surprisingly, Control4 and Intertel are manufacturers of hardware for end-users. 
Control4 manufactures smart-home equipment,47 and Intertel makes business 
phones48 as well as other types of end-user products for businesses. One 
unincorporated inventor, Michael Townsend, has only design patents in his 
portfolio for touch screen user interfaces. Interestingly, design patents may be 
seen as an inexpensive benefit. One respondent to the survey indicated that his 
company was considering applying for a design patent because it is 
“inexpensive and potentially useful.”49 That company, despite being a 
hardware business with 80% of its patents related to smartphones, has no 
design patents currently. 
Of additional note, the data does not indicate any significant hindrance for 
small participants from utility patent maintenance fees. Patent fees are 
 
 46.  This relationship appears to persist as companies grow their overall portfolio of 
patents. See supra, Table 16 and accompanying text.  
 47.  See CONTROL4, http://www.control4.com/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2014). 
 48.  See INTERTEL PHONES, http://www.intertel-phones.com/ (last visited Oct. 31, 
2014). 
 49.  Survey response. 
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generally not high,50 and the majority of lapsed patent maintenance fees do not 
appear to be the result of financial difficulties. Companies appear to allow 
some of their patents to lapse while preserving others in their portfolios. This 
makes sense if patents generally have a value greater than the cost of the 
maintenance fees.51 Other companies appear to choose to move their businesses 
in a different direction. Some instance of lapsed fees for profitable companies 
may simply be due to oversight or clerical error. 
C. Smartphone Patents and Funding 
1. Analysis 
The overwhelming majority of the corporate entities among the small 
participants were founded during or after 2000.52 The relationship, thus, 
between patents and funding for small participants may provide an important 
indicator of the openness of the smartphone market. 
The data shows that twenty-nine (or 63%) of the sample participants 
received some form of funding over the period studied, including seventeen 
entities that received at least one series of venture or “angel” funding.53 On 
 
 50.  United States Patent And Trademark Office Fee Schedule, USPTO, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee010114.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2014). 
 51.  Patents can lose value if they are found - either through litigation, due diligence, or 
by other contact from an interested party - to be unenforceable. Some companies may also 
choose to dedicate their patented technologies to the public.  
 52.  Of the forty corporate entities in the data set, 70% (twenty-eight) were founded 
after 2000. By contrast, many of the key large participants in the 2012 Smartphone Patent 
Study were incorporated many years earlier: 
  
Research in Motion 1984 
Apple 1976 
Samsung 1938 
Microsoft 1975 
Nokia 1871 
Google 1998 
Motorola 1928 
Sony 1946 
Huawei 1987 
Broadcom 1991 
 
Of the twenty-eight companies in the sample that only came into existence in the year 2000 
or later, eighteen received some form of funding during the period studied (64.3%). Of the 
twelve corporate entities that were less than ten years old, seven received funding (58.3%).  
 53.  The data shows similar results for the subset of small participants that are truly 
small companies, rather than larger companies that have small forays into the smartphone 
market. Of the companies that registered as small companies, fifteen (51.7%) received some 
form of funding.  
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average, these small participants had 1.41 patents granted and 4.45 patents filed 
before their first funding event. After the final round of funding, 79% of these 
participants (twenty-three of the twenty-nine) stopped filing for patents. Indeed, 
after the final round of funding, the average number of patent filings for all 
participants was only 0.79 patents per participant. Table 18 shows the 
relationship between patents and the first and last funding events. 
 
Table 18 – Average Number of Smartphone Patents 
 
 
 
Patent prosecution in our sample picks up during the periods between 
funding events, in particular right before the first funding event and before an 
exit event. The companies that received funding showed an average of 2.4 
patent filings during the six months before a funding event and 4.7 patent 
filings during the twelve-month period before a funding event. At least one 
patent application was filed by 37.9% of the companies six months before a 
funding event, and 44.8% of the companies filed at least one patent application 
within the twelve months prior to a funding event. Participants that received 
funding filed fewer patent applications after the events, with an average of 1.9 
patents during the six months after a funding event (with 34.5% filing at least 
one patent) and an average of 3.3 patents during the year after (with 51.7% 
filing a patent). 
To better understand the points at which companies choose to seek patents, 
we examined patent prosecution activity more closely. Table 19 presents the 
patent filings of each small participant in relation to the timing of the funding 
events. We focus on the last funding event or “exit” event to determine if these 
generate greater activity than other funding events.  
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Table 19 – Patents Before Exit Event54 
 
For exit events, nearly a majority of the small market participants in the 
sample, twenty-two (48%), experienced an exit event (either by acquisition or 
by initial public offering). On average, these twenty-two companies had 15.4 
patents filed before the exit event occurred. The above data shows a run-up to 
obtain a larger number of patents right before the exit event. Companies that 
had a regular funding event prior to their exit event acquired, on average, 
another 11.7 patents shortly before they were acquired or went public. 
While increases in the number of patents correlate to funding and exit 
events, the amount of money raised by those events does not correlate to the 
 
 54.  A “-” indicates that there was no previous event; the acquisition or IPO was the 
only funding event for this participant. 
 
Number of Patents 
Granted Before Exit 
Event 
Number of Patents 
Granted Before 
Previous Event Difference 
Airwalk Communications 9 
4 
5 
Augme Technologies, Inc. 2 
- 
- 
Bitstream Inc. 3 
- 
- 
Cellemetry, LLC 0 
0 
0 
Cequint, Inc. 4 
4 
0 
Control4 Corporation 22 
20 
2 
Core Mobility, Inc. 16 
- 
- 
Cortina Systems, Inc. 21 
1 
20 
Daylife, Inc. 2 
0 
2 
Inter-Tel, Inc. 5 
- 
- 
LiveWire Mobile, Inc. 1 
1 
0 
Nethra Imaging Inc. 2 
0 
2 
Newport Media, Inc. 60 
7 
53 
PureDepth Inc. 0 
- 
- 
SIRF Technology, Inc. 27 
0 
27 
StarHome GmbH 11 
0 
11 
Strix Systems, Inc. 7 
4 
3 
Ubinetics Ltd. 2 
0 
2 
Varia Mobil LLC 4 
- 
- 
Veveo, Inc. 27 
1 
26 
XG Technology, Inc. 27 
5 
22 
Average 16.14 
 
11.7 
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number of patents. Table 20 below shows that the funding amount and the 
number of granted patents before that event rarely move together. The 
correlation is very weak at 0.127. This correlation means that 1.6% (0.1272) of 
variance between the funding amount and the number of patents is related. 
 
Table 20 – Correlation Between Funding and Smartphone Patents 
 
 
 
There are, however, two very clear outliers: one a very high number of 
patents and one a very high funding amount. If the two outliers are removed, 
the correlation improves but only slightly as illustrated in Table 21 below. 
Without these outliers, the correlation coefficient is 0.312 (9.7% of variance is 
related); this does not indicate meaningful correlation. 
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Table 21 – Correlation Between Funding and Smartphone Patents 
Excluding Outliers 
 
 
 
The r correlation improves slightly to 0.192 when patent filings are 
considered rather than patent grants. With the two outliers removed, the r 
correlation between the amount of funding in respective funding events and the 
number of patent filings before those events is 0.41, another weak correlation 
coefficient. 
To rule out funding bias based on age, we ran a correlation analysis on age 
versus funding. The amount of funding that a company received does not 
appear to be a function of a company’s age. A regression analysis of all eighty-
five recorded funding events shows no correlation between age and amount. 
The r2 was very weak at 0.014 and was even weaker than the correlation 
between the number of patents and funding amount. However, an outlier (a 
funding amount of $732 million) caused the statistical significance to fall 
below a reliable threshold. With the outlier funding event removed, the 
statistical significance of the regression was restored and the r2 rose slightly to 
.084, which is still a weak correlation and which does not show a connection. 
The age of a company, thus, does not appear to be a good predictor for the 
amount of funding the company will receive nor does age create funding bias. 
2. Impact 
The data shows that small participants in the smartphone market with 
patents significantly outperform startups in general in their fund-raising 
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success.55 According to one study, 0.05% of startups receive venture funding 
and 0.91% of startups receive angel funding.56 In our sample, 63% received 
funding totaling $2.8 billion. In every measure we used to isolate the truly 
small companies from the small participants in the market that were actually 
part of large organizations, the data still showed more than half of the entities 
with smartphone patents receiving some form of funding. Moreover, 50% of 
our sample received more than one round of funding; and split between the 
twenty-nine companies that received funding, the funding received averaged 
$96,551, which exceeds the startup industry average of $78,406.57 
As our data showed, a company’s ability to build its smartphone patent 
portfolio correlates with the company’s ability to raise funds but not the amount 
of funds raised in each round. Though there is no causal relationship between 
the number of patents and the amount of funding, the companies’ actions show 
that they perceive this connection between patents and funding. The data also 
shows that age alone does not correlate with higher (or lower) funding 
amounts. The sample companies exhibited a common pattern in timing for 
prosecuting patents.58 The companies in the sample began to build patent 
portfolios, then sought funding, and then had an opportunity to operate in the 
market or merge with larger companies. Between funding rounds, companies 
increase their patents filings. According to the data, the small participants 
typically increased their acquisitions of patents at a significant level beginning 
twelve months before obtaining funding. This indicates that patented 
innovation increases a company’s ability to survive in the marketplace. After 
their final funding event (an acquisition, or an IPO), companies then 
significantly reduce their smartphone patent filings. 
This trend among the small participants indicates that the patent right 
serves as an important asset for small participants to enter the smartphone 
market. The patent right appears to strengthen the small participants’ existence 
and to strengthen the small participants ability to compete for necessary 
funding. The small participants also perceive the patent right as an important 
signaling marker for the company. Of the forty corporate entities in our sample, 
twenty-five (62.5%), mentioned patents somewhere on their own website.59 
This also indicates that companies value their patent portfolio as a means to 
 
 55.  According to a Money Tree study, venture capitalists entered only 3,995 deals 
totaling about $29 billion in 2013, an increase of 7% over the previous year. Jeffrey 
Davidson & Laura Cruz, Annual venture investment dollars rise 7% and exceed 2012 totals, 
PRICE WATERHOUSE COOPER (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/press-
releases/2014/annual-venture-investment-dollars.jhtml. 
 56.  Laura Entis, Where Startup Funding Really Comes From, ENTREPRENEUR (Nov. 
20, 2013), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/230011. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  See supra, Tables 20 and 21  
 59.  This percentage does not include the unincorporated inventors; six companies had 
no patent info and eight websites were down or otherwise unavailable. 
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entice interest from customers or investors.60 
Corporate mergers and acquisitions also give circumstantial evidence that 
patent rights provide access to market presence for small participants. For 
example, three of our selected companies were bought by larger organizations. 
CSR, a large UK-based semiconductor company, bought SiRF (a participant in 
our sample) for $136 million in stock. SiRF was a very active innovator and 
held 305 patents of which eighty-three were smartphone patents. CSR also 
bought Ubinetics (another sample participant) for $48 million in cash. 
Ubinetics was a less active innovator and only held twelve patents, of which 
three were smartphone patents. The third company, Intertel, was acquired by 
Mitel for $723 million. At the time of the acquisition, Intertel had a total of 
thirty-three patents, of which thirteen were smartphone patents. The patent 
rights appeared to be significant components of the acquisition strategies for all 
the companies involved. 
Lastly, the finding that companies significantly slowed or ceased filing for 
patents following the last funding round may be attributed to a variety of 
factors. The companies may simply have stopped innovating and shifted focus 
to other areas such as product manufacturing, customer acquisition and 
retention or sales. Alternatively, the companies might have switched to a trade 
secret-based business model once certain financial thresholds were reached. Or, 
companies may have begun to file under other names once they have sufficient 
financial stability, such as through the name of a patent holding subsidiary. 
And, it may also be possible that once financial stability was established, 
companies simply began purchasing patent rights from others rather than 
generating new patentable inventions from within. Finally, the reduction in 
patent filings may be less pronounced than the data indicates. This is due to the 
possibility that the data may be incomplete if some companies changed their 
names after they were acquired or if the entities themselves acquired another 
company. Nevertheless, there is a marked and unexplained slowdown in patent 
acquisition even among companies that are still functioning under the same 
name. 
D. Typology of Litigation 
We examined all the litigation involving the small market participants in 
 
 60.  Anecdotally, it also seems that seeking investment is a top reason for seeking 
patent rights. One survey respondent noted that the most important impact of smartphone 
patents on his business was the “[a]bility to negotiate with much more powerful business 
entities.” One survey respondent indicated that it used its patents only “when seeking 
funding” for the business and had sought funds more than ten times in the last three years. 
That respondent had never asserted infringement of its patents, in or out of court, or used its 
patents in advertisement for customers. The other survey respondent stated that his or her 
company used smartphone patents only in seeking investments and in informal assertions 
(e.g. cease and desist letters) against competitors.  
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our sample to understand how suits affected their market presence.  
1. Analysis 
In total, the fourty-six selected small participants were parties in sixty 
lawsuits–thirty-two as plaintiffs and twenty-eight as defendants. Thus, in terms 
of litigation, the average entity saw 1.3 suits with 35% of the companies 
involved in one or more public lawsuits. 
Few of these suits, however, involved patents, and even fewer involved 
smartphone patents. The total number of patent-related suits for all the 
companies was thirty-eight. Yet, those suits were concentrated among ten small 
participants, and the remaining thirty-six participants (78%) were not involved 
in any patent litigation.61 Of the ten companies that were involved in some 
form of patent litigation, all but one are still functioning or have been acquired. 
On average, the small participants had less than one (0.83) suit each. Only six 
of the companies were defendants in a patent suit.62 Of the twenty-three suits 
where our sample companies were plaintiffs, only four of the suits asserted 
smartphone patents.63 Of the fifteen suits where our sample companies were 
defendants in patent litigation, twelve included one or more patents with a 
smartphone patent classification, all of which were in the “communications” 
category.64 
 
 61.  See supra section III.E (35% of small companies have no suits of any type.). 
 62.  The following six companies from the sample were defendants in a patent 
litigation: 1) Wisair; 2) SiRF Technology; 3) Strix Systems.; 4) LiveWire Mobile; 5) Augme 
Technologies.; and 6) Control4. The following thirteen companies were plaintiffs in 
litigations adverse to the above defendants: 1) Broadcom; 2) Global Locate; 3) Linex 
Technologies.; 4) Callertone Innovations; 5) LucidMedia Networks; 6) Velti; 7) Sipco; 8) 
Lutron; 9) US Ethernet Innovations; 10) Olivistar; 11) Inncom International; 12) Azure 
Networks; and 13) Tri-County Excelsior Foundation. We did not undertake the qualitative 
and subjective determination of whether the patents asserted against our sample were closely 
enough related to the smartphone industry. However, from a high level analysis, most of the 
patents were closely related with assertions of GPS, data communications, and caller ID 
patents.  
 63.  The following seven companies from the sample were plaintiffs in a patent 
litigation: 1) Nonend Inventions; 2) Cequint; 3) StarHome; 4) SiRF Technology; 5) Veveo; 
6) Augme Technology.; and 7) Varia Mobil.  
 64.  See supra section III.B, Tables 3-5; Linex Techs. v. Motorola, Inc., et al., No. 
9:05-CV-80300); Global Locate, Inc. v. SiRF Tech., Inc. et al., No. 4:06-CV-06964 (N.D. 
Cal. Nov. 14, 2006); Lutron Elecs. Co., Inc. v. Control4 Corp., No. 2:06-CV-00401, 2009 
WL 137170 (D. Utah Jan. 20, 2009); Global Locate v. SiRF. Tech., Inc. (ITC Inv. No. 337-
TA-602); Broadcom Corp. v. SiRF Tech., Inc., No. 8:08-CV-00546, 2009 WL 8591845 
(C.D. Cal. July 20, 2009); Inncom Int’l Inc. v. Control4 Corp., No. 3:09-cv-00649-CFD (D. 
Conn. 2009); Broadcom Corp. v. CSR plc et al., No. 8:10-CV-01662 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 
2011); Callertone Innovations LLC v. U.S. Cellular Corp. et al., No. 1:11-CV-01068; Sipco, 
LLC v. Control4 Corp., No. 1:11-CV-0612-JEC, 2012 WL 526074 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 16, 
2012); Azure Networks LLC et al. v. Samsung Telecomms. America LLC et al., No. 6:12-
CV-00745; U.S. Ethernet Innovations, LLC v. Cirrus Logic, Inc., No. 6:12-CV-00366, 2013 
WL 8482270 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2013); Wilan, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 3:14-CV-01507 (S.D. 
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Several of the small participants in this study brought patent infringement 
claims against large companies, including some identified in the 2012 
Smartphone Patent Study as “key” participants. For example, Nonend 
Inventions N.V. sued Spotify (a music services company that had three million 
paying users at the time) for infringement of Nonend’s patents covering content 
streaming.65 Another small player, Cequint, Inc., sued Apple for infringement 
of Cequint’s patents covering advanced caller identification technology.66 
Augme Technologies, Inc. sued Yahoo, Pandora, and others for infringing on 
Augme’s patents covering a process for adding functionality to a web page.67 
Of the six small participants in the smartphone market that were defendants 
in patent litigation, three were registered with the USPTO as large 
corporations68 and three as small ones.69 These three “small” participants, 
Augme Technologies, Control4, and Strix Systems, are now fairly large 
successful companies, though some with only small smartphone-related 
ventures. Augme Technologies, for example, acquired Hipcricket and now, 
operating under that name, reported revenue of $7.3 million in the first fiscal 
quarter of 2014.70 Though currently operating at a deficit, Hipcricket does not 
appear to fault patent litigation for any of its losses and in fact lists patent 
litigation as an asset in its public filings.71 Control4 has over three hundred 
employees and generated revenue of $109.5 million in 2012.72 Strix systems in 
 
Cal. June 23, 2014). 
 65.  Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, Nonend Inventions N.V. v. Spotify USA Inc. 
et al., No. 1:13-CV-00389 (D. Del. Mar. 8, 2013), available at 
https://search.rpxcorp.com/lit/dedce-51308-nonend-inventions-nv-v-spotify (last visited Oct. 
18, 2014); Dawn McCarty, Spotify Sued by Nonend Over Technology for Music Sharing, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 17, 2012, 12:06 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-
17/spotify-sued-by-nonend-over-technology-for-music-sharing.html. 
 66.  Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, Cequint Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 1:11-CV-
01224 (D. Del. Dec. 12, 2011), available at https://search.rpxcorp.com/lit/dedce-47651-
cequint-v-apple (last visited Oct. 18, 2014); Wolfgang Gruener, Cequint Sues Apple Over 
Advanced Caller ID, TOM’S GUIDE (Dec. 14, 2011, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.tomsguide.com/us/patent-infringement-lawsuit-apple-iphone,news-13503.html. 
 67.  Augme Techs., Inc. v. Tacoda LLC, No. 1:07-CV-07088, 2011 WL 5547983 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2011) (Tacoda was in the middle of being acquired by AOL when this 
lawsuit was filed.); Augme Techs., Inc. v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. 09-05386-JCS, 2012 WL 
3627408 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2012); Augme Techs., Inc. v. Pandora Media, Inc., No. 1:11-
CV-00379, 2012 WL 6055010 (D. Del. Dec. 5, 2012); Augme Techs., Inc. v. Gannett Co., 
No. 1:11-CV-05193; 2011 WL 3207118 (E.D. Va. July 26, 2011); Augme Techs. Inc. v. 
Velti USA Inc., No. 1:12-CV-00294 (D. Del. Mar. 9, 2012); Augme Techs. Inc. v. 
Millennial Media Inc., No. 1:12-CV-00429 (D. Del. Apr. 5, 2012). 
 68.  See supra note 12. 
 69.  See supra note 18. 
 70.  Hipcricket, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) at 12 (July 20, 2011), available at 
http://a.aug.me/augmeimg/44000/43235.pdf. (Augme/Hipcricket has brought patent 
infringement actions against AOL, Time Warner Cable, and Yahoo Inc.). 
 71.  Id. at 11. 
 72.  Control4, INC., http://www.inc.com/profile/control4 (last visited Oct. 18, 2014). 
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2007 held the top two positions in the number of nodes and radios shipped in 
terms of both revenues and market share.73 One of the six defendants among 
the small participants in the sample, Wisair Ltd., seems to be no longer 
functioning,74 while the other five are either active or acquired.75 
Non-practicing entities are largely absent from litigation involving the 
small participants.76 Of the twelve plaintiffs who brought smartphone patent 
law suits against the small participants in our sample, five were listed by RPX 
as NPEs .77 Of those few sample participants that were involved in litigation 
with a NPE (8.7%), all but one were named as co-defendants in a suit where the 
primary defendant was a large corporation, including Apple and Samsung.78 
The companies that defended patent infringement suits against a NPE also 
tended to have large portfolios of patents themselves.79 
A study by Professor Chien using NPE litigation data for high-tech patents 
from the Stanford Intellectual Property Litigation Clearinghouse (IPLC) shows 
a similar result.80 According to her study, 76% of all high-tech patent suits 
were brought by public or private corporations, and among industries, the range 
was 71-84%. Individuals initiated 5% of suits and nonprofits 1%. That left the 
NPE share at 17%, including 8% of all hardware suits, 20% software suits, and 
23% of all financial suits.81 Therefore, among the technology suits (hardware 
and software), NPEs brought only 14% of all the high-tech patents lawsuits. 
This is slightly higher than our figure of 8.7% for the narrower class of 
smartphone patents. Contrary to popular perception, the percentage of NPE-
 
 73.  News Spotlight, STRIX SYSTEMS, http://www.strixsystems.com/newsspotlight.aspx 
(last visited Oct. 18, 2014). 
 74.  Azure Networks and Tri-County Excelsior Foundation added Wisair and several 
other technology companies as defendants to an amended complaint in a lawsuit initially 
brought against Samsung. Though Wisair was named as a defendant, there is no indication 
that the lawsuit had any meaningful impact on Wisair’s ability to function or contributed to 
Wisair’s demise. Even if this one litigation were damaging to Wisair, it would stand alone as 
an outlier in our study as the only company so adversely affected by smartphone patent 
litigation.  
 75.  These observations were made as of October 2014.  
 76.  Non-practicing entities (NPEs) involved in patent litigation are identified by RPX 
and listed in the database of litigations. Their status was determined by reference to the RPX 
database of annotated litigations, which is: available at http://www.rpxcorp.com/. 
 77.  1) Azure Networks; 2) Linex Technologies, Inc.; 3) Callertone Innovations; 4) 
Sipco; and 5) U.S. Ethernet Innovations. 
 78.  Sipco, LLC v. Control4 Corp (1:11-CV-00612); Olivistar, LLC v. Control4 
Corporation (2:14-CV-00393). 
 79.  The following 4 companies from the sample were sued by an NPE for alleged 
infringement of smartphone patent: 1) Wisair; 2) Strix Systems; 3) LiveWire Mobile; and 4) 
Control4. 
 80.  Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and 
Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. Rev. 1571 (2009). Here, high-
tech patents refer to hardware, software, and financial patents based on the USPTO patent 
classification of the litigated patents. See id. at 1593-94. 
 81.  Id. at 1600. 
412 STANFORD TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:375 
initiated lawsuits is lower than anticipated. 
Of the forty-six small participants in the sample, two (4.3%) were 
identified as an NPE themselves.82 Both of these companies initiated patent 
lawsuits against very large companies, but not against other small players. 
In all, only 6.5% of the small participants were sued for patent 
infringement by an operating company. There is also only one instance of a 
large actor identified in the 2012 Smartphone Patent Study suing a small 
participant.83 
2. Impact 
Patent litigation itself does not seem to be a major threat for small 
participants in the smartphone field. Twenty-two percent of the small 
participants in our sample were involved in patent litigation at some point from 
their inception through October 2014. However, of those only half (11%) of the 
small participants were named as defendants in a suit where a smartphone 
patent had been asserted. And of those 5 companies, only two (4%) were 
named as a defendant directly while the others were named as co-defendants in 
a suit where the primary defendant was a large corporation.84 With regard to 
NPEs the data is similar, with only one member out of 46 from the sample 
facing an NPE directly in patent litigation. This data does not indicate that these 
lawsuits adversely affected any of the small participants’ ability to function in 
the smartphone market.85 The data does suggest, however, that a strategy of 
amassing a defensive patent portfolio would be unnecessary. Neither large 
industry players nor non-practicing entities appear to have much of an interest 
in suing small participants for patent infringement. 
By contrast, there are several instances where small participants have used 
their patents against large companies as a method of obtaining compensation 
for their innovations.86 On the reverse side, some litigation appears to result in 
 
 82.  The following two companies in the sample were identified by RPX corp. as 
NPEs: 1) Nonend Inventions; and 2) Augme Techs. 
 83.  Broadcomm sued a relatively small market participant—SiRF—for patent 
infringement related to GPS. SiRF was a semiconductor manufacturing company. 
Broadcomm later named SiRF in another patent lawsuit against CSR, a much larger 
semiconductor company which had acquired SiRF. 
 84.  Global Locate, Inc. v. SIRF Technology, Inc. et al. No. 4:06-CV-06964; Global 
Locate v. Sirf. Tech, Inc. (ITC Inv. No. 337-TA-602); Lutron Elecs. Co. v. Control4 Corp., 
No. 2:06-CV-00401; Broadcom Corporation v. SiRF Technology Inc No. 8:08-CV-00546; 
Inncom Intl Inc v. Control4 Corp No.3:09-CV-00649; Sipco, LLC v. Control4 Corp, No. 
1:11-CV-00612; Olivistar, LLC v. Control4 Corporation, No. 2:14-CV-00393. 
 85.  No company publicly attributed any financial difficulties to patent litigation.  
 86.  See e.g., Veveo, Inc. v. Verizon Services Corp. et al., No. 1:10-CV-06709 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2010); Cequint Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 1:11-CV0-01224 (D. Del. 2013); 
Augme Technologies Inc. v. Pandora Media Inc., No. 1:11-CV-00379; Augme Techs., Inc. 
v. Yahoo!, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2012); Augme Techs., Inc. v. 
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the acquisition of the defendant. For example, Bitstream was acquired by 
Monotype imaging, which had previously sued Bitstream for patent 
infringement. Likewise, in the midst of litigation with Broadcomm, SiRF was 
acquired by the much larger semiconductor company CSR. This acquisition 
was not directly related to the litigation as the purchase was part of a strategy 
for CSR to become “a connectivity centre for everything from bluetooth to FM 
radio, GPS and near-field communications.”87 
IV. OPENNESS OF THE MARKETPLACE 
The relationship of patents to the openness of the smartphone market for 
small participants is, like that of large participants, difficult to isolate. The 
trends in three areas provide insight for the assessment of openness of the 
smartphone market to small participants: A) market access; B) market exit; and 
C) litigation. 
A. Access to the Market 
The findings show that patents in the smartphone field help provide access 
to the market for small players. Whether the ease of access is equivalent for 
small market participants that do not hold any patents, the data here 
demonstrates that a portfolio of smartphone patents increases the likelihood of 
survival, and of being funded, acquired, or going public. The sample of patent 
holding companies with a small presence in the smartphone market showed a 
very high rate of survival or successful exit, well above the average for small 
tech companies in general. Though not an absolute requirement to do business, 
obtaining a patent covering smartphone innovations does seem to help 
considerably in gaining access to funding. 
The research affirms that patents provide credibility to small participants 
with respect to investors. One reason may be that patents are expensive to 
prosecute and the existence of a patent demonstrates access to capital and a 
willingness to invest in the company’s future (on average the companies had 
filed 4.45 patents before their first funding event88). This credibility may 
explain why a small entity in the smartphone field with patents has a 
disproportionately high probability of receiving funding and surviving. 
The research shows that a very large portfolio of patents is not necessarily 
better than a small one. A company with just a few patents greatly increases its 
 
AOL Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88463 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2012); Varia Holdings LLC v. 
Samsung Electronics Co, Ltd., No. 1:12-CV-01899; Veveo, Inc. v. Comcast Corp. et al., No. 
1:13-CV-11885; Nonend Inventions NV v. Spotify USA Inc. et al., No. 1:13-CV-00389; 
Starhome GmbH v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 743 F.3d 849 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 87.  Maija Palmer, CSR seeks out acquisitions, Financial Times, Oct. 27, 2009. 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/b23392ea-c321-11de-8eca-00144feab49a.html 
 88.  See supra section IV.C.1. 
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access to the market through funding and a company with ten or more patents 
substantially increases its likelihood of survival.89 Beyond ten patents, 
however, no significant increase was observed in the ability to survive and 
there is no meaningful correlation between the number of patents and the 
amount of funding received.90 This is important with respect to entry costs. The 
cost of obtaining a professionally drafted and prosecuted U.S. patent is 
somewhere between $5,000 and $20,000.91 Therefore, the cost of obtaining 
several patents is not prohibitively high for a small commercial enterprise. If a 
very large portfolio of patents were required for survival and funding, the legal 
and filing fees could be considered a substantial barrier to entry. For example, 
if small companies needed a defensive portfolio to respond to large 
participants’ infringement assertions that were designed to quash competition, 
the cost of entry might be prohibitive. This study did not observe such a barrier. 
Small participants, though, focused on the communications segment of the 
market. The findings show that the vast majority (80%) of smartphone patents 
produced by the small players are communications patents.92 Software is the 
second in line with 12%, design is a low 6%, and hardware represents only 2% 
of patents in our data set.93 The low rate of hardware and design patents might 
be explained by the costs of reducing an invention to practice. For hardware, 
expensive machinery may be needed to build prototypes of hardware. This may 
change in the near future with the proliferation of 3D printing. Design patents 
are usually for consumer products and our small players rarely have a 
consumer-facing product. Instead, they sell their products to other businesses 
that then include them in a consumer product. 
The low number of software patents as compared to communications 
patents is more difficult to explain because the process of creating software and 
new communications methods is closely related. This might be explained by 
the confusing jurisprudence surrounding the enforceability of patents on 
software. The Supreme Court has in essence stated that software patent claims 
need to be limited to a commercial embodiment.94 Another possible 
explanation is that prosecuting and enforcing communications patents may be 
perceived as easier. 
 
 89.  See supra Table 17. 
 90.  See supra sections IV.B.1 (Table 17) and IV.C.1. 
 91.  Paul Chang, The Costs of Obtaining Patent Protection, WOLVERINE STARTUP LAW 
(Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.wolverine-startuplaw.com/2014/04/15/the-costs-of-obtaining-
patent-protection/. 
 92.  See supra Table 13. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  See e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 593 (2010); Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS 
Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2347(2014). 
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B. Exit 
A successful “exit” is the hallmark of the venture capital world95 and 
represents an open market if both access and exit options exist for small 
participants. For an investor, the “exit” goal is to make a profit on the invested 
capital. Exit may occur by an internal buy-out of early investors, by another 
company’s acquisition of the organization, or by the company offering shares 
to the public on a stock market. 
The small participants with smartphone patents fare very well in terms of 
their potential for an exit. Of the forty companies represented among the forty-
six small participants sample, fifteen (37.5%) exited through a successful 
acquisition event. Another four (10%) offered shares publicly on a stock 
exchange.96 This is a very high percentage showing that there are readily 
available exit options along with investor confidence in those businesses 
holding patents with a small presence in the smartphone market. The patents, 
thus, appear to serve as a valuable asset for small participants. 
But as with funding in general, there is no meaningful correlation in the 
research results between the amount of money generated by an exit event (an 
acquisition or an IPO in this study) and the number of patents. Thus, while a 
smartphone patent portfolio may be helpful to secure a successful exit, there is 
no indication that a large portfolio with many patents is necessary for a small 
market participant to exit successfully. 
C. Litigation 
Few patent holders seem interested in suing the small players in the 
smartphone field for patent infringement. With two exceptions, the small 
participants were not the targets of any oppressive costly litigation brought by 
competitors.97 To the contrary, small participants sued large industry players 
for patent infringement more often than the other way around. And the few 
study participants that were the subject of patent litigation campaigns had 
already grown large enough to absorb those costs on their balance sheets by the 
time of that litigation, as demonstrated by the research results relating to market 
longevity.98 In addition, NPEs do not appear to target small participants. This 
 
 95.  See e.g. Exit Strategy, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/exitstrategy.asp (last visited Oct. 31, 2014); Nicole 
Gravagna, Peter K. Adams, Venture Company Exit Options, DUMMIES, 
http://www.dummies.com/how-to/content/venture-company-exit-options.html (last visited 
Oct. 31, 2014). 
 96.  Data regarding the internal buyout of investors was not publicly available. 
Companies that went public are: 1) PureDepth; 2) Augme; 3) XG Technology; and 4) 
Control4.  
 97.  One company closed its doors following patent litigation, Wisair, Ltd., but the suit 
did not appear as the reason Wisair ceased to exist.  
 98.  See supra sections IV.A.1 and IV.D.1. 
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study found only one example when a small market participant was sued as a 
primary defendant by a NPE for infringement of a smartphone patent.99 
The relatively low instance of patent litigation may be due to cost. 
According to a study performed by the American Intellectual Property Law 
Association (AIPLA) in 2013, the costs of patent litigation are extremely 
high.100 Table 22 below illustrates these costs. Expenses can run as high as $2.8 
million for disputes where the amount in controversy is between $1 million and 
$25 million. Disputes that exceed $25 million more than double that cost with 
an average of $5.9 million. And disputes of $1 million or less cost on average 
almost $1 million through trial, a cost that often exceeds the amount at stake. 
 
Table 22 – Costs of Patent Litigation Generally101 
Amount in Controversy Cost through Discovery Cost through Trial 
<$1mm $530K $970K 
$1mm - $10mm $1.2mm $2.1mm 
$1mm - $25mm $1.7mm $2.8mm 
$10mm - $25mm $2.2mm $3.6mm 
>$25mm $3.6mm $5.9mm 
 
When an NPE sues a company for patent infringement, the cost of 
litigation is slightly lower.102 
While the threat of costly patent infringement litigation might be used to 
create a significant barrier to entry, the cost-benefit analysis makes it unlikely 
that a small participant will actually be sued. The benefits for plaintiffs may be 
limited. According to Price Waterhouse Cooper’s annual litigation trends 
report, the most prevalent measure of damages for patent infringement is a 
reasonable royalty.103 Reasonable royalties are typically calculated as a 
percentage of revenue made on a product that embodies an infringed patent and 
that would have resulted from a hypothetical licensing negotiation.104 This 
means that even with a hypothetical royalty as high as 10%, a small target 
company would need $10 million in revenue just from infringing products for a 
plaintiff to recover the costs of bringing the lawsuit.105 While the Price 
 
 99.  Sipco, LLC v. Control4 Corp (1:11-CV-00612); Olivistar, LLC v. Control4 
Corporation (2:14-CV-00393); See also supra IV.D.1. 
 100.  2013 Report of the Economic Survey, AIPLA, 
http://www.aipla.org/learningcenter/library/books/econsurvey/2013EconomicSurvey/Pages/d
efault.aspx (last visited Oct. 31, 2014).  
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. This slight reduction in cost is likely due to the fact that NPEs, by their nature, 
have no competing business to permit a countersuit and counter-discovery.  
 103.  2014 PWC Study, supra note 2 at 13. 
 104.  See TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 898-99 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 105.  Moreover, jury trials yield much higher damages than bench trials and are used 
much more often in patent trials, especially in the telecommunications industry. 2014 PWC 
study, supra note 80, at 15. But small companies are known to play the bully card if a larger 
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Waterhouse Coopers’ study further indicates that median damages are the 
largest in the telecommunications field compared to the nine other fields 
examined,106 this does not seem to be enough to justify the high cost of 
litigation or the long time to trial (median time to trial for an NPE is 2.5 years 
with a 25% success rate and the median time for a practicing entity is 2.28 
years with a 35% success rate). Even if a plaintiff is able to secure a sufficiently 
high judgment, there is no guarantee that the small market participant will be 
able to pay. The high cost of patent litigation, the inability to shift costs to the 
loser, and the low potential for high damages may actually be keeping 
offensive litigants from stifling small players. 
For some of the large market participants, restraint in litigation against 
small participants may be a strategic choice for good will. If a large player 
begins suing all its potential competitors to eliminate them from the industry, 
they may receive backlash from their own customers or a government agency, 
or they may inadvertently bring publicity to competitors from media coverage. 
One survey participant explained that the first mover advantage—being the first 
with a new product on the market—as opposed to patent assertions is the best 
way to protect a company’s place in the market. It is also a difficult task to 
convince a jury and the public that a large corporation suing a small entity is 
not a bully. 
Lastly, cease and desist letters might pose threats to small participants. 
These letters inform an adverse party of the existence of one or more patents 
and of the patent owner’s intent to assert their rights. This in turn triggers 
several legal doctrines. It helps ensure that the patent owner does not lose the 
right to enforce the patent in the future.107 A letter that specifies a patent also 
provides notice to the target company—a requirement for a claim of willful 
infringement, which can significantly increase damages. A widespread letter 
campaign could extract costly licensing fees from some of the targets that fear 
litigation and its high costs. But a cease and desist letter campaign may have a 
weak effect if litigation is not seen as a real possibility. The high cost of 
litigation, the low likelihood of recouping those costs from a small company, 
and the low instance of observed litigation against small companies may 
undercut the threat to small market participants of cease and desist letters. 
However, we have no way of measuring the actual effect of cease and desist 
 
company or a non-practicing entity brings a patent infringement suit. These facts combined 
with the high costs likely discourage patent litigation against small players in the smartphone 
field (and likely in other fields as well). This may explain why large market participants in 
the smartphone space and non-practicing entities choose not to assert patents against small 
players in court. 
 106.  2014 PWC Study, supra note 2, at 13.  
 107.  For instance, the doctrines of collateral estoppel or laches prevent a patent holder 
from laying in wait while a company builds an entire business around a patented invention 
and then pouncing on them to demand their revenue years later. See e.g. Ashe v. Swenson, 
397 U.S. 436, 436 (1970). 
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letters such as licensing fees paid to avoid litigation.108 
The data shows that patent litigation does not seem to be a barrier to entry 
in the smartphone field. The common perception that small companies are 
being stifled by unscrupulous, unfair, and overburdening litigation is not 
supported by our data for the smartphone market.109 
CONCLUSION 
Patents are an important tool for small players entering the smartphone 
market. With a few patents, small participants gain access to the market 
through financing that results from their increased attractiveness to investors as 
compared to the startup industry in general. The ability to obtain a number of 
patents also enhances small participants’ ability to survive and to effect a 
successful market exit. This means that entry and exit are enhanced by small 
participants’ patent holdings. Patent litigation, whether from operating 
companies or NPEs, does not appear to be a significant concern for small 
players and does not appear to pose barriers to entry. These are all positive 
indicators that patent rights are providing incentives for innovation among 
entry participants and small industry players. 
  
 
 108.  Our review of press releases from the companies did not provide any information 
about cease and desist letter campaigns and we had insufficient survey responses to draw 
information. 
 109.  Loek Essers, ‘Patent Trolls’ Cost Tech Companies $29 Billion Last Year, Study 
Says, PC WORLD (June 27, 2012), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/258395/patent_trolls_cost_tech_companies_29_billion_last
_year_study_says.html. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A – LIST OF SELECTED SMALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE SMARTPHONE 
MARKET 
Airwalk Communications, Inc. 
Altair Semiconductor, Ltd. 
Augme Technologies, Inc. 
Beyer Jr, Malcolm K (Individual Inventor) 
Bitstream, Inc. 
Carrier IQ, Inc. 
Cellemetry, LLC 
Cequint, Inc. 
Control4, Corp. 
Core Mobility, Inc. 
Cortina Systems, Inc. 
Daylife, Inc. 
Exphand, Inc. 
IncNetworks, Corp. 
Intertel, Inc. 
Interstate Electronics, Corp. 
ISP Operator Corp. 
iTechTool, Inc. 
Kauffman, George M (Individual Inventor) 
KD Secure, LLC 
Knapp, Ronald P (Individual Inventor) 
Legend Silicon Corp. 
LiveWire Mobile, Inc. 
Nethra Imaging, Inc. 
Newport Media, Inc. 
NexStep, Inc. 
Nonend Inventions, N.V. 
Octasic, Inc. 
ORO Grande Technology, LLC 
PureDepth, Inc. 
Salmon Technologies, LLC 
Samhain Inion, LLC 
SiRF Technology, Inc. 
StarHome, GmbH. 
Strix Systems, Inc. 
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Sudharshan, Srinivasan (Individual Inventor) 
Tensorcomm ,Inc. 
Townsend, Michael L (Individual Inventor) 
Ubinetics, Ltd. 
Varia Mobil, LLC 
Veveo, Inc. 
Viktor, Kaptelinin (Individual Inventor) 
Wisair, Ltd. 
Wmode, Inc. 
Xcerion, Ab. 
XG Technology, Inc. 
Spring 2015] SMALL PARTICIPANTS IN SMARTPHONES 421 
APPENDIX B 
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